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Abstract
To successfully complete a complex project, be it a construction of an airport or
of a backbone IT system, agents (companies or individuals) must form a team having
required competences and resources. A team can be formed either by the project issuer
based on individual agents’ offers (centralized formation); or by the agents themselves
(decentralized formation) bidding for a project as a consortium—in that case many
feasible teams compete for the contract. We investigate rational strategies of the agents
(what salary should they ask? with whom should they team up?). We propose con-
cepts to characterize the stability of the winning teams and study their computational
complexity.
1 Introduction
Consider a complex project: involved, intricate, and consisting of many varied yet interre-
lated parts. The successful completion of such a project requires coordinated cooperation
of a number of experts—people and companies—often organized as teams of subcontrac-
tors [12]. For instance, in the construction industry, to build an apartment building (a
rather standard endeavor), typically, 30 to 40 individual sub-contractors are involved in 100
to 150 separate activities [11].
Assigning sub-tasks of a complex project to subcontractors is common. In the UK, the
proportions of construction employees employed by sub-contractors in years 1983–1998 has
grown by 20% [5]. In the UK, between 2008 and 2011, the number of freelancers increased by
12%; in Australia in 2012, 17.2% of the workforce were self-employed (8.5% as independent
contractors). These are only a few examples of a growing tendency to develop projects by
employing many specialized sub-contractors instead of a single company.
Nevertheless, it is not clear how to organize the market both for the issuer of the project
(in this paper, called the client) and the subcontractors (later called the agents). Interaction
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between the agents applying for the employment in a project and the client is captured by
the hiring a team problem [4, 7, 3]. The agents have private costs of participating in the
project and may have different skills, thus only certain teams are able to complete the
project on time. The client organizes an auction in which individual agents place their bids,
i.e., their required salaries. After collecting the bids, the client selects the cheapest feasible
team, i.e., the set of agents able to complete the project on time with the lowest total bid.
We generalize the hiring a team problem by exploring two organizations of the market.
The original approach corresponds to the centralized setting : the agents communicate only
with the client by issuing their required salaries (also referred to as bids) and it is the client’s
responsibility to select an appropriate team. Our main contribution lies in considering a
different organization of the market, where the agents first form teams and then bid for
the project as consolidated groups rather than as individuals. Since the organization of the
agents into teams is not managed by a central entity, we refer to this setting as decentralized.
To the best of our knowledge this formulation of the problem is novel and leads to a new
class of games. This formulation has a natural interpretation: a client may not want to
coordinate a project and to deal with individual subcontractors, but instead expects that
the subcontractors coordinate among themselves and propose a bid for completing the whole
project.
Additionally, we generalize the hiring a team problem by considering two types of agents’
compensation. In the project salary model (corresponding to the original approach) the
agents are payed for their work irrespectively of the contributed effort. We propose a new
payment model, the hourly salary, in which the agents are payed for the time spent working
on the project.
Throughout this paper we assume that we are given an oracle that, for a given team,
can determine whether this team is feasible, i.e., whether it can successfully complete the
project. In particular, given a budget and the requested agents’ salaries, the oracle can be
asked to find a feasible team or to find the cheapest feasible team. In Appendix C we show
how to create such an oracle for a concrete scheduling model (which moreover generalizes
a commodity auction); we also determine its exact complexity.
Our approach generalizes two models: commodity auctions [8] and path auctions [9]
(Appendix C). In a commodity auction, there is a set of items I = {i1, i2, . . . , iq} and
agents owning certain subsets of I. A team is feasible if the agents have together all the
items from I. A commodity auction can be mapped to our problem by considering that
I is a set of independent activities; an agent owning a subset corresponds to an agent
having skills to complete these activities. In a path auction, there is a graph G with two
distinguished vertices: a source s and a target t. The agents correspond to the vertices in
the graph; some vertices are connected by edges. A team is feasible if the participating
agents form a path from s to t.
Since we consider teams of agents with sufficient skills, our model resembles cooperative
skill games [1] and coalitional resource games [13]. These games, however, consider the
stability of the grand coalition and interaction between its members. In contrast, our
approach is to expose the competition between multiple teams. Thus, we do not apply
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Table 1: Summary of our results. “Existence” denotes whether a team/equilibrium always
exists. “Checking” gives the complexity of checking whether a given team satisfies the def-
inition. “Finding” gives the complexity of finding a team/equilibrium. FFT and FCFT
are the complexities of the problems FFT and FCFT, respectively. The symbols † (re-
spectively, §) denotes that a result is valid only in the project (respectively, hourly) salary
model. The symbol ✸ denotes that a result is valid only if the salaries of the agents are
rational numbers. Whenever one of the symbols †, § or ✸ is provided, it means that the
problem for the other cases is still open.
solution concept Existence Checking Finding
d
ecen
tra
l.
rigor. strongly winning team Not always O(n2 · FCFT) O(n5 log(nv)FCFT) † ✸
strongly winning team Not always open problem
weakly winning team Always O(n5 log(nv)FCFT) † ✸
auction winning team Always O(FFT) O(v · FFT)cen
tra
l.
winning team (with asking salaries) N/A O(FCFT)
Strong Nash Equilibrium
Always †
Not always §
O(FCFT) O(n3 log(nv)FCFT)) † ✸
the typical cooperative game theory concepts and, instead, model agents’ cooperation and
competition as a non-cooperative game (see Appendix B for a detailed comparison). Our
approach is thus closer to endogenous formation of coalitions [6, 2, 10].
In this paper we identify and formalize a new class of coalition games, which are the
extensions of the hiring a team games. We propose concepts to characterize the stability
of the winning teams and study their computational complexity. Table 1 summarizes our
results. All the proofs omitted from the main text are provided in the appendix.
2 A Complex Project as a Game: a Formal Model
We consider a game in which a client (an issuer) submits a single complex project. The
client has a certain valuation v of the project that is the maximal price that she is able to
pay for completing the project.
There is a set N = {1, 2, . . . n} of n agents. For each agent i, we define φmini > 0 to
be the agent’s minimal salary for which i is willing to work. This minimal salary may
correspond to the agent’s personal cost of participating in the project. The agent prefers
to work for φmini than not to work (and then to work for higher salary). The value φ
min
i is
private to the agent—neither the issuer nor the other agents know φmini .
A subset of the agents’ population N forms a team to work on the project; the paper’s
core contribution is on how this process should be organized. A team C is a triple 〈NC , φC , cC〉
consisting of: the set of participating agents NC ⊆ N ; a salary function φC : NC → N
assigning salaries to member agents; and the total cost of the team cC ∈ N—the total
amount of money earned by the participants of C. Salaries are discrete (not only money
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is discrete, but also it is common in real-world auctions to specify a minimal difference
between two successive bids). However, to derive some computational results, in some
clearly marked places, we assume that the salaries can be rational numbers.
The same team may organize the work of its members on the project in various ways
with varying efforts from participants. To capture this property, we introduce a notion of
a schedule, σC : NC → N, that assigns to each member of a team the amount of time this
agent needs to spend on the project. Of course, there may exist many schedules for a single
team. We expand the discussion on the notion of schedule in Appendix C.
We consider two models of agents’ compensation. Let φtotC (i) denote the total amount of
money agent i gets in team C (naturally, cC =
∑
i∈NC
φtotC (i)). In the project salary model
φtotC (i) is equal to the salary of the agent φC(i) (and thus does not depend on the amount
of work assigned to that agent). In the hourly salary model φtotC (i) is equal to the product
of the salary φC(i) and the time ti during which i processes her part of the project (ti is
known from the schedule).
In the project salary model the agents are interested in earning as much money as
possible. The hourly salary model represents agents who are interested in having the highest
possible hourly wage; thus, e.g., an agent prefers to work ti = 1 time unit with a salary
φi = 3 to working ti = 2 time units with a salary φi = 2.
Different schedules might result in different completion times of the project. If the
schedule results in a completion time that is satisfactory for the client, we say that the
schedule is feasible. For some teams there might not exist a feasible schedule (e.g., if the
members lack certain skills). We assume that there is an oracle that can answer whether a
given schedule is feasible or not. This very general setting can be instantiated by providing
a concrete oracle. For instance, in Appendix C we show that by appropriately specifying
the oracle, our results can be applied to commodity auctions and to path auctions. We also
show there how to replace the general oracle with a concrete scheduling model.
A team C is feasible iff (i) the asking salaries are no-lower than the minimal salaries,
φC(i) ≥ φ
min
i ; and there exist a feasible schedule such that: (ii) the project budget is not
exceeded (cC ≤ v), and (iii) the cost cC of the team C is consistent with the salaries φC .
Specifically, in the project salary model cC =
∑
i∈NC
φC(i). In the hourly salary model
cC =
∑
i∈NC
tiφC(i).
A team C is cheaper than C′ if it has a strictly lower cost cC < cC′ or if it has the same
cost, but it is preferred by a deterministic tie-breaking rule ≺, NC ≺ NC′ (for the sake of
concreteness we assume that ≺ is the lexicographic order in which a team is represented by
a concatenation of the sorted list of the names of its members).
Throughout this paper we use the Find Feasible Team (FFT) and Find Cheapest
Feasible Team (FCFT) problems.
Problem 1. An instance of Find Feasible Team (FFT) consists of a project (with a budget
v) and the set N of the agents with (known) minimal required salaries φmini . The question
is to find some feasible team or to claim there is no such. In the Find Cheapest Feasible
Team (FCFT) we ask for the cheapest feasible team.
4
3 Centralized Formation of Teams
In the centralized model agents submit their asking salaries φi directly to the client. The
client, having the asking salaries, wants to form the cheapest feasible team. We first show
that this problem reduces to FFT, the problem of finding a feasible team. Then, we analyze
the optimal bidding strategies of agents.
Proposition 1. The problem FCFT can be solved in time O((log v+n)FFT), where FFT
is the complexity of the problem FFT. Having the asking salaries of the agents, the problem
of finding the winning team can be solved in time O(FCFT), where FCFT is the complexity
of the problem FCFT.
The agents may behave strategically and manipulate their asking salaries to maximize
their payoffs. We model this problem as a strategic game. An action of agent i is her asking
salary φi ≥ φ
min
i . The payoff of i is φi iff i is a member of the cheapest feasible team;
otherwise the payoff of i is 0.
Interestingly, in the project salary model, there exist sets of vectors of actions which are
stable against collaborative strategies of the agents. We recall that a vector of the agents’
actions is a Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE) if no subset of the agents can change its actions
so that all the deviating agents obtain strictly better payoffs.
For each subset of the agents N ′ ⊆ N , by C∗(N ′) we denote the cheapest feasible team
using only the agents from N ′ (if there is no feasible team consisting of the agents from N ′,
the team C∗(N ′) does not exist).
Theorem 2. In the project salary model, if there exists a feasible team then there exists a
Strong Nash Equilibrium. In every SNE, the set of the agents who get positive payoffs is
the set of agents forming the cheapest feasible team, NC∗(N).
Proof. Let N∗ = NC∗(N) be the set of the agents participating in the cheapest feasible team.
We say that the action φi of the agent i is minimal if and only if φi = φ
min
i . We show how
to construct the asking salaries φ∗i of the agents from N
∗ that, together with the minimal
actions of the agents outside N∗, form a Strong Nash Equilibrium. A sketch of the proof is
as follows. We show the set of linear inequalities for the variables φi, i ∈ N
∗. Let us denote
the maximal values of φi which satisfy the inequalities as φ
∗
i (maximal in the sense that if
we increase any value φ∗i , then the new values will not satisfy all the inequalities any more).
We show that the actions φ∗i of the agents from N
∗, together with the minimal actions of
the agents outside of N∗, form an SNE and that the set of the solutions φ∗i that satisfy all
the inequalities is nonempty.
The first inequality states that the values φi must lead to a feasible solution:
∑
i∈N∗
φi ≤ v. (1)
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Next, as C∗ is the cheapest feasible team, for each feasible team C′ (N∗ 6= NC′) such that
N∗ ≺ NC′ , C
∗ must have (weakly) lower cost:
∑
i∈N∗\N
C′
φi ≤
∑
i∈N
C′
\N∗
φmini . (2)
For a C′ preferred over C∗ (N∗ 6= NC′ and NC′ ≺ N
∗), C∗ must have strongly lower cost:
∑
i∈N∗\N
C′
φi <
∑
i∈N
C′
\N∗
φmini . (3)
First, if the values φ∗i satisfy inequalities (1)-(3) and the agents outside of N
∗ play their
minimal actions, then the agents from N∗ will get positive payoffs. If they did not get
the positive payoffs, it would mean that there exists a feasible cheaper team C′. However,
inequalities (2)-(3) imply that the agents from N∗ \NC′ induce the lower total cost than the
total cost of the agents from NC′ \N
∗; this ensures that agents N∗ with actions φ∗i form a
cheaper team than C′.
Next, we show that no set of agents NC′ can make a collaborative action φ, after which
the payoff for all NC′ agents will be greater than previously. By contradiction, assume that
there exists such a set of agents NC′ and such an action φ. First we consider the case when
the payoff of some agent i /∈ N∗ would change. This means that after φ there would be
a new cheapest feasible team C′, where i ∈ NC′ . However, we know that the total cost of
the agents from N∗ \ NC′ is lower than the total cost of the agents from NC′ \ N
∗. This
means that C′ cannot be cheaper than the team consisting of the agents from N∗. Finally,
consider the case when only the payoffs of the agents from N∗ change (and thus NC′ ⊆ N
∗).
However, if the strict subset of N∗ could form a feasible team, then C∗(N) would not be
the cheapest. Thus, NC′ = N
∗. This means that every agent from N∗ must have played
a higher action (and others must have not changed their actions). Since φ∗i were maximal,
this means that after the action φ some inequality, for some feasible team C′′, would not
hold any more. Thus, we infer that C′′ is cheaper than C′.
To check that there always exists a solution, we see that the definition of N∗ ensures
that the values φ∗i = φ
min
i satisfy all inequalities.
Finally, by contradiction we prove the N∗ is formed by the same agents as forming the
cheapest team. Assume that the set of the agents that get positive payoffs in some SNE
is N ′ 6= N∗. However, if the agents from (N∗ \ N ′) play their minimal actions, then the
team consisting of the agents from N∗ would be cheaper than the team consisting of the
agents from N ′. Thus, the agents from (N∗ \N ′) can deviate, getting better payoffs. This
completes the proof.
Interestingly, there is no analogous result for hourly salary model (see Proposition 13
in Appendix A). The proof of Theorem 2 is constructive, but it requires considering all
feasible teams and, so, leads to potentially high computational complexity. Finding an
efficient algorithm for the problem of finding Strong Nash Equilibria in the project salary
model is open. On the other hand, if the salaries of the agents can be rational numbers,
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we can find the salary function in SNE by a polynomial reduction to the FCFT problem.
This result is particularly meaningful if the salaries have high granularity; rounding such a
rational solution gives an integral solution which is nearly perfect.
Proposition 3. In the project salary model, if the salaries are rational, then finding a
Strong Nash Equilibrium can be solved in time O(n3 log(nv)FCFT)), where FCFT is the
complexity of the problem FCFT. Checking whether a given vector of the asking salaries
〈φi〉, i ∈ N is a Strong Nash Equilibrium can be solved in time O(FCFT), where FCFT is
the complexity of the problem FCFT.
4 Decentralized Formation of Teams
If the agents can communicate and coordinate their strategies, they form teams and bid
for the project as consortiums. We propose the concept of a (rigorously) strongly winning
team, in which no subset of agents can successfully deviate. We show how to characterize
(rigorously) strongly winning teams and how to reduce the problem of finding them to
the FCFT problem. We show that the strongly winning teams may not exist, and so we
introduce the concept of a weakly winning team. We prove that a weakly winning team
always exists (provided that there is a feasible team). We demonstrate how to reduce the
problem of finding weakly winning teams to the FCFT problem.
We model the behavior of the agents as a strategic game. Agent i’s action is a triple
〈NC , φC , bC〉. Intuitively, such an action means that the agent i decides to enter the team
C = 〈NC , φC , bC〉. The payoff of the agent is equal to φC(i) if (i) C is feasible, (ii) each agent
j ∈ NC agrees to participate in C (i.e., they all play C, and their payoffs are consistent with
the bid of the team bC), and (iii) there is no feasible cheaper team C
′ such that all the agents
from NC′ agree to participate in C
′. Otherwise, the payoff of i is 0.
4.1 Strongly Winning Teams
As the payoffs depend on whether the others agree to cooperate, rather than the Nash
Equilibrium, the Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE) should be used. In the following defi-
nition we propose an even more stable equilibrium concept—the Rigorously Strong Nash
Equilibrium (RSNE), which requires that no subset of agents can deviate such that each
agent gets a payoff at least as good as its payoff before deviating (instead of SNE’s strictly
better). Our approach is motivated by cautious agents. In an SNE, the agents have no
incentive to deviate if they get the same payoff; however they also have no incentive not
to deviate. Yet, any deviation will result in a serious payoff loss for some agents (changing
their payoffs from a positive φ to zero). A cautious agent will prefer not to be exposed to
the possibility of such a loss.
Definition 1. The vector of actions pi is a Rigorously Strong Nash Equilibrium (RSNE)
iff there is no subset of agents NC such that the agents from NC can make a collaborative
action C after which the payoff of each agent i from NC would be at least equal to her payoff
under pi and the payoff of at least one agent i ∈ N would improve.
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A RSNE requires that the payoff of at least one agent i ∈ N must change as we treat
as equivalent the teams with the same payoffs. For instance, in a game with three agents,
a, b and c, if the team {a, b} gets a positive payoff, it does not matter whether c plays
〈{c}, v + 1〉 or 〈∅, v + 1〉: in both cases all payoffs are the same (recall that v is the client’s
maximal budget for the project).
Below we introduce additional definitions that help characterize the RSNE in our games.
Definition 2. A feasible team C is explicitly endangered by a team C′ if (i) C′ is feasible,
(ii) NC ∩NC′ = ∅ and (iii) C
′ is cheaper than C. A feasible team C is implicitly endangered
by a team C′ if (i) C′ is feasible, (ii) NC ∩NC′ 6= ∅ and each agent from NC ∩NC′ gets in C
′
at least as good a salary as in C, and (iii) either NC 6= NC′ or φC 6= φC′ .
If there are agents belonging to both teams (NC ∩NC′ 6= ∅), we do not consider the total
cost of the alternative team C′, as the decision whether C′ will be formed depends solely on
the agents from NC ∩ NC′ : if they decide to form C
′, C will not be formed, thus the client
won’t be able to choose between C and C′.
A feasible team C is (rigorously) strongly winning iff there is a (Rigorously) Strong Nash
Equilibrium in which the agents from NC get positive payoffs φC . The following theorem
relates endangerment (Definition 2) and a winning team.
Theorem 4. The team C is rigorously strongly winning if and only if C is not explicitly
nor implicitly endangered by any team.
The result in Theorem 5 stated for RSNEs transfers to SNEs after a slight modification
of the payoffs. It is sufficient to assume that an agent playing an empty team receives
slightly higher payoff than if she plays a non-empty losing team. In other words, this modi-
fication associates some small costs with the preparation of a bid by the agents. Hereinafter,
whenever we mention a strictly winning team we assume that the agents incur such costs.
To state the result for SNEs we also need to use the definition of a team C being strictly
implicitly endangered by C′. This definition differs from being implicitly endangered only
by not requiring the agents from NC ∩ NC′ to have at least as good payoffs, but strictly
better payoffs in C′ than in C.
Theorem 5. If there are small but positive costs of preparing the offer by the agents then the
team C is strongly winning if and only if C is not explicitly nor strictly implicitly endangered
by any team.
Theorems 4 and 5 lead to a simple brute-force algorithm for checking whether the team C
can be a part of some RSNE. It is sufficient to check whether for each set of agents N ′ ⊆ NC
there exists a payoff function φC and a cost c such that C is explicitly or implicitly endangered
by 〈N ′, φ, c〉 (such a condition can be checked by enumerating the payoff functions which
assign to each agent his or her minimal salary, the salary that he or she obtains in C, or the
next higher salary). Below, we characterize RSNEs in the project salary model even more
precisely.
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Lemma 6. In the project salary model, the set of agents participating in a rigorously
strongly winning team is the same as the set of agents participating in the cheapest fea-
sible team.
Lemma 7. In the project salary model the bid of a strongly winning team is equal to the
maximal allowed price v.
Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 show that the problem of finding a strongly winning team reduces
to the problem of finding a feasible team. The problem, thus, becomes an optimization
problem; the strategic behavior of agents has no impact (see Propositions 14 and 15 in
Appendix A). An RSNE (and even an SNE) may not exist in some instances.
Proposition 8. Both in the project salary and in the hourly salary model, there may not
exist a strongly winning team even though there exists a feasible team.
Proof. Consider a project with budget v = 5; and three identical agents a, b, c with minimal
salaries φmini = 2 (in the hourly salary model, assume that each agent spends exactly 1 time
unit on the project); a team of any two agents is feasible (able to complete the project on
time and within the budget).
For the sake of contradiction assume there exists a team C that gets positive payoffs.
Without loss of generality we assume that NC = {a, b}. At least one of the agents, let us
say a, has to get salary at most equal to 2.5. However, the agents a and c, with the salaries
equal to 3 and 2 respectively, can form a feasible team in which both a and c get better
payoffs.
4.2 Weakly Winning Teams
Proposition 8 suggests that a notion of a strongly winning team is too restrictive. The team
{a, c} can profit by deviating, e.g., by playing φ(a) = 3 and φ(c) = 2. But a should not
be willing to deviate, as {a, c} with payoffs φ(a) = 3 and φ(c) = 2 too is not stable (for
instance, the team {b, c} can play φ(b) = 2 and φ(c) = 3, and successfully deviate from
{a, c}). In the above example no team strongly wins, even though intuitively there are
teams that would agree to work. Thus, we propose a weaker notion of a winning team.
Definition 3. A feasible team C is weakly winning if it is not explicitly endangered by any
team and for each feasible team C′ such that C is implicitly endangered by C′, there exists a
feasible team C′′ such that C′ is explicitly or implicitly endangered by C′′.
Proposition 9. There exists a weakly winning team if and only if there exists a feasible
team.
Proposition 10. In the project salary model, if the salaries of the agents can be rational
numbers, the problem of finding a weakly winning team and the problem of checking whether
a team C′ is weakly winning can be solved in time O(n5 log(nv)FCFT).
Finding an efficient algorithm for the same problem with discrete salaries is still an open
question.
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5 Mechanism Design
In this section we analyze two mechanisms that a client can use to find a winning team:
the first one sets the project’s budget v; the second one uses a first-price auction.
First, we show that if the client is allowed to change the budget v there exists a simple
mechanism (based on a binary search) ensuring the existence of a strongly winning team.
Theorem 11. If there exists a feasible team, then there exists a budget v∗ for which there
exists a strongly winning team. The problem of finding such a v∗ can be solved in time
O(log v · FFT).
In the second approach we use the first-price auction in which teams participate. In
a standard first-price auction, an item’s price starts from some minimal value (the least
preferred outcome for the owner of the item). Bidders place bids for the current price. The
asking price is gradually increased until there are no further bids; the last bidder wins.
Similarly, in our proposed auction, the auction starts from the original budget v (the least
preferred outcome for the client); the asking price is gradually decreased. Teams place bids
for the current asking price (as in the standard first-price auction, multiple bids for the
same asking price are not allowed). The auction stops when no feasible team bids lower
than the current asking price. This procedure leads to the concept of an auction-winning
team.
Definition 4. A team C is auction-winning iff there is no feasible team C′ such that bC′ < bC
and for each agent i ∈ NC ∩NC′ the agent gets better salary in C
′, φC′(i) ≥ φC(i).
Proposition 12. The problem of checking whether a feasible team C is auction-winning can
be solved in time O(FFT). The problem of finding an auction-winning team can be solved
in time O(v · FFT).
6 Conclusions
We presented a new class of coalitional games that model cooperation and competition
for employment in a complex project. Our games extend and relate to a number of well-
known problems, such as coalition formation, coalitional auctions, auctions for sharable
items, etc. We considered two market organizations. In a centralized market, the winning
team is selected by the client based on bids from individual agents; the agents are strategic
about the salaries they request. In a decentralized market, the already-formed teams bid
for the project, thus the agents are strategic both regarding their salaries and regarding
their cooperation partners.
We proposed concepts of stability for each of our models and we showed how to reduce
the problem of finding a winning team to the problem of finding a feasible one, for which
we assumed we have an oracle with known complexity.
To instantiate our abstract model, in Appendix C we show how to solve a scheduling
problem in which the project is a set of independent tasks and the agents have certain skills
in processing them (represented by unrelated processing speeds).
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A Proofs Omitted from the Main Text
Proposition 1. The problem FCFT can be solved in time O((log v+n)FFT), where FFT
is the complexity of the problem FFT. Having the asking salaries of the agents, the problem
of finding the winning team can be solved in time O(FCFT), where FCFT is the complexity
of the problem FCFT.
Proof. We start from showing that the problem FCFT can be solved in time O((log v +
n)FFT). First, we solve FFT with binary search over v to find the lowest bid v∗ for which
there still exists a feasible team.
Next, we need to find the team bidding v∗ that is preferred by the tie-breaking rule.
We recall that C ≺ C′ if C precedes C′ in the lexicographic order. We consider the agents in
the increasing order of their names. For each agent i we decrease her salary by 1 (φmini :=
φmini −1) and solve FFT for v = v
∗−1. If there is one, this means that in the initial setting
there exists a feasible team offering bid v∗ and having agent i as a member. We store i as
a member of the winning team. With the modified salary of i and an updated budget of
v∗ = v∗ − 1 we consider the next agent. Otherwise we reset the agent salary φmini and the
budget v∗ to their previous values and consider the next agent.
For the second part of the proposition, note that solving the problem of finding the
winning team requires solving FCFT with the minimal salaries of the agents set to their
asking salaries (φmini = φi).
Proposition 3. In the project salary model, if the salaries are rational, then finding a
Strong Nash Equilibrium can be solved in time O(n3 log(nv)FCFT)), where FCFT is the
complexity of the problem FCFT. Checking whether a given vector of the asking salaries
〈φi〉, i ∈ N is a Strong Nash Equilibrium can be solved in time O(FCFT), where FCFT is
the complexity of the problem FCFT.
Proof. Let us start from analyzing the complexity of finding a Strong Nash Equilibrium.
First, we solve a single instance of the FCFT problem to find N∗ = NC∗(N). Next, as in
the proof of Theorem 2, we introduce the variables φi, i ∈ N
∗ and inequalities (1)-(3). If we
find the values φi, i ∈ N
∗ satisfying all the inequalities, then the values φi, i ∈ N
∗, together
with the minimal salaries of the agents outside of N∗, will form a Strong Nash Equilibrium.
The set of inequalities given in the proof of Theorem 2 is a linear program; there are,
however, exponentially many constraints (a constraint for each possible team). We con-
struct a separation oracle by a polynomial reduction to FCFT. Since the ellipsoid method
requires O(n3L) calls to the separation oracle (where L is the size of the representation
of the problem; here L = O(log(nv))), this allows us to solve the linear program in time
O(n3 log(nv)FCFT ).
To check whether all the inequalities are satisfied, it is sufficient to solve FCFT with the
following parameters. The minimal salaries of the agents fromN∗ are set to φi (∀i∈N∗φ
min
i :=
φi). The minimal salaries of the agents outside of N
∗ are left unmodified. Let C denote the
solution of such instance of the FCFT problem. There exists a not-satisfied inequality if
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and only if NC 6= N
∗. The not-satisfied inequality is the inequality that corresponds to the
team C 6= C∗. This completes the proof.
Now, let us analyze the complexity of the problem of checking whether a given vector
of the asking salaries 〈φi〉, i ∈ N is a Strong Nash Equilibrium. First, we find a winning
team C for 〈φi〉. According to Proposition 1 we can do this by solving an instance of the
FCFT problem (with ∀i : φmini := φi) . Next, we solve another instance I2 of the FCFT
problem with the parameters set as follows. We set minimal salaries of the agents from NC
to their asking salaries (∀i∈NCφ
min
i := φi). The minimal salaries of the agents outside of NC
are left unmodified. If the solution to I2 consists of the members of NC only, we claim that
a vector 〈φi〉, i ∈ N is a Strong Nash Equilibrium. Otherwise, it is not.
Theorem 4. The team C is rigorously strongly winning if and only if C is not explicitly
nor implicitly endangered by any team.
Proof. ⇐= Assume that there exists a rigorously strongly winning team C; thus there exists
a Rigorously Strong Nash Equilibrium RSNE in which the agents from NC get positive
payoffs. This implies that the agents from NC agree on the action 〈NC , φC , bC〉; other agents
(N \NC) have zero payoffs. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that there exists a
feasible team C′ such that C is explicitly or implicitly endangered by C′.
If NC ∩NC′ is empty (C is explicitly endangered by C
′), then NC′ must be cheaper. This
however contradicts the assumption that the agents from NC get positive payoffs.
Assume thus thatNC∩NC′ is non-empty (i.e., C is implicitly endangered by C
′). Consider
the following collaborative action of agents (N \NC) ∪NC′ . All the agents from NC′ make
action C′. Each agent i from N \ (NC ∪NC′) makes an action 〈{}, φ∅〉, where φ∅ is an empty
function. We show that after playing this action no agent from (N \ NC) ∪ NC′ will get
lower payoff and that some agents will get a strictly better payoff (which will contradict the
assumption that RSNE is a Rigorously Strong Nash Equilibrium). Clearly each agent from
N \ (NC ∪NC′) does not decrease her payoff (as previously it was equal to 0). Now, we show
that the agents from NC′ will get at least the same payoff as before. Since we know that C
is implicitly endangered by C′ (and thus the agents from NC ∩NC′ get in C
′ at least as good
payoff as in C) it is sufficient to show that the agents from NC′ will get positive payoffs.
Indeed, there is no feasible team that includes some agents from N \ (NC ∪NC′) (as these
agents play {}). Also, the agents from NC \ NC′ do not agree on the collaborative action
(they still play C) and thus, cannot form a feasible team. Thus, after such change of played
actions C′ is the only feasible team that the members agreed on. Finally, we can show that
at least one agent will get a strictly better payoff. Either NC = NC′ (and since φC 6= φC′ ,
some agent must get a different payoff) or NC 6= NC′ (and the agents from NC′ \NC will get
a positive payoff).
=⇒ Assume that C is not explicitly nor implicitly endangered by any team. First, if
the agents from NC make the collaborative action C, then they will all get positive payoffs.
Indeed, the agents in NC could not get positive payoffs only if there would exist a cheaper
feasible team C′ such that NC ∩ NC′ = ∅. This would, however mean that C is explicitly
endangered by C′. Next, we show that the state in which the agents from NC make the
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collective decision C and the other agents play arbitrary actions is RSNE. For the sake
of contradiction let us assume that there exists a subset of agents NC′ which can make
a collaborative action C′ after which the payoff of everyone from NC′ would be at least
equal to her payoff in C. This would, however mean that C is either implicitly or explicitly
endangered by C′. This completes the proof.
Lemma 6. In the project salary model, the set of agents participating in a rigorously
strongly winning team is the same as the set of agents participating in the cheapest fea-
sible team.
Proof. Let C denote the cheapest feasible team. We show that for any other team C′, such
that NC 6= NC′ , C
′ cannot be rigorously strongly winning. For the sake of contradiction
let us assume that C′ is rigorously strongly winning. Let N∩ = NC ∩ NC′ . Since C is the
cheapest, the sum of salaries of the agents from NC \N∩ in C is lower or equal to the sum
of salaries of the agents from NC′ \ N∩ in C
′. Consider a team C′′ consisting of the set of
agents NC and the following salary function. The salary of each agent from NC \NC′ is the
same as in C and the salary of each agent from N∩ is the same as in C
′. Since the bid cC′
of C′ was below v, the bid of C′′ is also below v. Thus, C′′ is feasible. Also, C′ is implicitly
endangered by C′′, which leads to contradiction and completes the proof.
Lemma 7. In the project salary model the bid of a strongly winning team is equal to the
maximal allowed price v.
Proof. Let C be a strongly winning team. If bC < v we could increase the salaries of some
participating agents. The resulting team would implicitly endanger C.
Proposition 9. There exists a weakly winning team if and only if there exists a feasible
team.
Proof. Consider a feasible team C that is not explicitly endangered (such a team exists
provided there exists a feasible team). Let E denote a set of feasible teams implicitly
endangering C. If E = ∅, C is strongly winning and, thus also, weakly winning. If there exists
C′ ∈ E such that C′ is not (implicitly or explicitly) endangered by any feasible team, then
C′ is strongly winning (and, thus also, weakly winning). Otherwise, C is weakly winning.
If there is no feasible team then there is no weakly winning team.
Proposition 10. In the project salary model, if the salaries of the agents can be rational
numbers, the problem of finding a weakly winning team and the problem of checking whether
a team C′ is weakly winning can be solved in time O(n5 log(nv)FCFT).
Proof. Consider the problem of finding a weakly winning team. First, we look for a rigor-
ously strongly winning team. If there is one, it is also weakly winning, and so the procedure
is complete. If there is no rigorously strongly winning team it is sufficient to find a team
that is not explicitly endangered by any other team. We can do this by solving a single
instance of the FCFT problem.
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Next, consider the problem of checking whether a team C′ is weakly winning. We first
check whether the team is explicitly endangered by any other team. We can do this by
solving a single instance of the FCFT problem for the set of agents N \NC′ .
Now, we look for a rigorously strongly winning team that endangers C′. We do this in
the same way as in the proof of Proposition 15. The only difference is that we addition-
ally introduce the following inequalities. We assume the same notation as in the proof of
Proposition 15. For each i ∈ NC ∩NC′ we require: φC(i) ≥ φC′(i).
Theorem 11. If there exists a feasible team, then there exists a budget v∗ for which there
exists a strongly winning team. The problem of finding such v∗ can be solved in time O(log v ·
FFT), where FFT is the complexity of the problem FFT.
Proof. Let v∗ be the smallest value such that there exists a feasible team. We show that
for v∗ there exists a strongly winning team. Let C∗ be the most preferred (according to
the tie-breaking rule ≺) feasible team for v∗. For the sake of contradiction let us assume
that there exists a team C′ such that C∗ is strictly implicitly or explicitly endangered by
C′. Of course bC′ ≤ v
∗ (otherwise C′ would not be feasible). If C∗ is explicitly endangered
by C′ (NC∗ ∩NC′ = ∅), it means C
′ is cheaper than C∗; and we get a contradiction with the
definition of v∗. Otherwise (C∗ is strictly implicitly endangered by C′), let i ∈ NC∗ ∩ NC′ .
Now, i must get strictly better salary in C′ than in C∗. Thus if we change the salary of i in
the team C′ to φC′(i) = φC∗(i) we get a contradiction—a cheaper feasible team.
To find such a v∗, one has to run a binary search over v.
Proposition 12. The problem of checking whether a feasible team C is auction-winning can
be solved in time O(FFT). The problem of finding an auction-winning team can be solved
in time O(v · FFT); FFT is the complexity of the problem FFT.
Proof. To check whether a team C is auction-winning one has to solve the problem of
existence of the feasible team for the asking price: v = bC − 1 (representing the next asking
price in the first-price auction); and for each i ∈ NC set φ
min
i = φC(i) (these agents must
get at least the same payoffs as in C). If no such team exists, C is auction-winning.
To find an auction-winning team one can simply simulate the auction.
Proposition 13. In the hourly salary model there may not exist a Strong Nash Equilibrium
even though there exists a feasible team.
Proof. Let us consider the following instance. The budget is v = 49. There are 3 agents:
a, b, and c; their minimal hourly salaries are φmina = φ
min
b = φ
min
c = 1. All two-agent teams
can complete the project: if a and b cooperate they can complete the project spending on it
ta = 10 and tb = 10 time units, respectively; if a and c cooperate they must spend ta = 22
and tc = 2 time units; if b and c cooperate they must spend tb = 2 and tc = 38 time units.
For the sake of contradiction let us assume that there exists a Strong Nash Equilibrium.
First, consider the case when the agents a and b get positive payoffs in SNE. By the budget
constraint, φb ≤ 3. If φb = 3, then φa = 1. The total cost of {a, b} is 40. However, c, by
playing φc = 1 can form a cheaper team {a, c} with the total cost 24. If φb ≤ 2 and φa = 1,
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then a has an incentive to play higher. If φb ≤ 2 and φa ≥ 2, then b and c are better off by
playing a collaborative action with φb = 3 and φc = 1—after such an action a team {b, c}
is cheaper (cb,c = 44) than {a, b} (ca,b ≥ 50) and {a, c} (ca,c ≥ 46). Thus, a and b cannot
both have positive payoffs in SNE.
Second, assume that the agents a and c get positive payoffs in SNE. The total cost of
{a, c} is 22φa + 2φc. In such case, if b plays φa then the new team {a, b} with total cost
10φa + 10φa forms a new cheapest team.
Finally consider the case when b and c get positive payoffs in SNE. This means that
φc = 1. But a, by playing 1 can form a team {a, c} with the total cost 24. This completes
the proof.
Proposition 14. Checking whether a team is rigorously strongly winning can be solved in
time O(n2 · FCFT), where FCFT is the complexity of the problem FCFT.
Proof. Let us assume that we want to check whether the team C is rigorously strongly
winning. First, we check whether we can increase the salary of any agent so that the team
would still be feasible. If we can, C is not rigorously strongly winning. Otherwise, we solve
FCFT for the set of agents N \ NC . If there exists a non-empty solution C
′ with the cost
cC′ < cC or such that cC′ = cC and C
′ ≺ C, this means that C is explicitly endangered by C′,
and thus is not rigorously strongly winning. Otherwise, C is not explicitly endangered by
any team.
Next, we check whether C is implicitly endangered by some team C′. We change the
names of the agents so that the agents from NC were the first ‖NC‖ agents in the lexico-
graphic order. Now, for each agent i from NC we do the following procedure. We solve
FCFT for the set of agents N \{i}, for the minimal salaries of the agents from NC changed
to their salaries in C, and for the budget v set to cC . If there exists a feasible C
′ to FCFT
such that the set NC′ overlaps with NC (overlapping can be tested in time O(n)), then C is
implicitly endangered by C′. We already know that there is no non-overlapping team with
the cost lower than cC . Thus, if for no agent i from NC we find such implicitly endangering
team, this means that there is no feasible team C′ such that NC ∩ NC′ 6= ∅. Thus, in such
case we conclude that C is rigorously strongly winning.
Proposition 15. In the project salary model, if the salaries of the agents can be rational
numbers, finding a rigorously strongly winning team can be solved in time O(n5 log(nv)FCFT),
where FCFT is the complexity of the problem FCFT.
Proof. First we solve FCFT to find the cheapest team C. We know that the set of the
agents participating in a rigorously strongly winning team is NC (Lemma 6) and the total
cost of such a team is v (Lemma 7). We only need to find the salary function of such a team.
For every agent i from NC , we introduce a variable φC(i). We will show the linear program
for the variables φC(i), to which the solution is a rigorously strongly winning team. At the
same time we will show how to implement the separation oracle for the linear program.
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First equality states that the salaries of the agents satisfy the feasibility constraint:
∑
i∈NC
φC(i) = v (4)
Next two inequalities model explicit endangerment. For each team C′, such thatNC∩NC′ = ∅
and C′ ≺ C:
∑
i∈NC
φC(i) <
∑
i∈N
C′
φmini . (5)
For each team C′, such that NC ∩NC′ = ∅ and C ≺ C
′:
∑
i∈NC
φC(i) ≤
∑
i∈N
C′
φmini . (6)
Note that we can check the above two inequalities by solving FCFT problem for the set of
agents N \ NC . If the resulting team C
′ is cheaper than C, this means that the inequality
constraint for C′ was violated. Otherwise, all the above inequalities are satisfied.
Last, for each team C′, such that NC∩NC′ 6= ∅ and NC 6= NC′ we introduce the inequality
modeling implicit endangerment:
∑
i∈NC\NC′
φC(i) +
∑
i∈N
C′
\NC
φmini > v. (7)
We can check this inequality in the same way as we checked whether the team was implicitly
endangered in the proof of Proposition 14: by swapping the names of the agents, for each
i ∈ NC solving FCFT for the set of agents N \ {i}, and checking the overlapping of the
appropriate sets. The whole procedure requires the time O(n2 · FCFT).
As the result, we showed the reduction of the problem of finding a rigorously strongly
winning team to the linear program with n variables and a separation oracle running in
time O(n2 · FCFT).
B Other Solution Concepts
In this section we give a brief overview of other solution concepts that can be applied to
describe winning teams in our games. Most of these solution concepts have their drawbacks
and they do not allow to determine winning teams. On the other hand, we point out
two ideas that, we believe, are interesting for further study. The first idea is to apply the
concept of the Coalitional Farsighted Conservative Stable Set to our setting. The second is
to apply the concepts inspired by the graph interpretations. These two solution concepts
are, however, more involved, and, so, we believe that our definition of a weakly winning
coalition is the natural simplification, and the first step to understand the complexity of
the agents’ interactions.
In the following subsections we present the discussion on the application of different
solution concepts to our model.
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B.1 Cooperative Game Theory Approach
It may seem that our solution concepts are closely related to solution concepts from the
cooperative game theory. For instance, the definition of Rigorously Strong Nash Equilibrium
is close in spirit to the concept of the core from the cooperative games. However, there are
some substantial differences. In cooperative game theory it is commonly assumed that the
value of a coalition (in the cooperative game theory teams correspond to coalitions) depends
only on the members of this coalition. The following example shows that this is not the
case in our problem.
Example 1. Consider 2 agents a and b with the minimal salaries φmina = 1 and φ
min
b = 2.
The maximal budget of the issuer is v = 2. Consider two team formed by single agents
C1 = {a}, and C2 = {b}. Let us assume that C2 is feasible. The value of C2 depends on
whether the agent C1 is feasible or not.
The above example encourages one to consider our problem as a cooperative game
with externalities. However, in such games the values of the coalitions depend only on
the partition of the agents into coalitions. In our case, however, the whole coalitions are
strategic, and their values depend on the actions (the bids) of the other coalitions. We
provide a detailed discussion regarding applicability of selected concepts from cooperative
game theory in the two following subsections.
B.2 The Core
Although the notion of the core is initially known from the cooperative game theory, there
is a natural generalization to strategic games. In this generalization we say that team C
with payoff function φ is in the core if and only if there is no feasible team C′ with payoff
function φ′ such that every agent in C′ gets, according to φ′, a better payoff than according
to φ.
Although, in cooperative game theory we use a simplified model in which feasibility
means just that the total payoff of the agents does not exceed the value of the team (i.e.,
the bid of the team, in our approach), we may use the more demanding notion of feasibility
from our model. As a result, a team C is in the core if and only if it is not implicitly
endangered by any other team.
Intuitively, the notion of the core in our games is missing an important element. Indeed,
a team C might be in the core even though some other team C′, disjoint with C, can offer a
better price and, consequently, win the auction and be awarded the project.
B.3 The (Farsighted) Stability
Another notion known from the cooperative game theory that is worth considering is the
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. The stable set is the set of all payoff vectors such
that (i) no payoff vector in the stable set is dominated by another vector in the set, and (ii)
all payoff vectors outside the set are dominated by at least one vector in the set.
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In the light of our previous example from Proposition 8, it is even more appealing
to consider the farsighted von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. A farsighted coalition is
more deliberative, it considers that if it makes a deviation, the second team might react as
a consequence of the first team’s action, next the third team might react, and so on without
the limit. In the original formulation the agents are considered to be optimistic—they are
willing to deviate if the deviation starts some sequence of deviations that would lead to a
better outcome.
In our games the vN-M stable set, and the farsighted vN-M stable set, might be empty.
Example 2. Consider the example from Proposition 8. There is a project with the budget
v = 5; and three identical agents a, b, c with minimal salaries φmini > 2. Every team formed
by any two agents is feasible. For the sake of clarity of the presentation let us assume
that the payoffs of the agents can be the natural numbers only. Let us consider the team
C1 = {a, b} with the payoffs φ
a = 3, and φa = 2. If the team C1 is in the stable set, then the
team C2{b, c} with the payoffs φ
b = 3, and φc = 3, which dominates C2, must not be in the
stable set (otherwise it would contradict the internal stability requirement). Since C2 does
not belong to the stable set, and it is dominated only by the team C3 = {a, c} with the payoffs
φa = 2, and φc = 3, we infer that C3 must belong to stable set. However, C3 is dominated
by C1, which leads to contradiction. By symmetry, we see that the stable set is empty.
The same reasoning as given in the example above applies to the farsighted vN-M stable
sets. The alternative definition in which the agents are conservative corresponds to the
Coalitional Farsighted Conservative Stable Set. Intuitively, in this definition the agents
are willing to deviate only if every sequence starting from this deviation leads to a better
outcome for them.
We believe that these two cases consider too extreme behavior of the agents. Neverthe-
less, we think that considering coalitional farsighted conservative stable sets in our game is
a very appealing direction for the future work.
B.4 Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria
Another way of weakening the notion of the (rigorously) strongly winning team is to consider
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria. Intuitively, in the Coalitional-Proof Nash Equilibrium we
first assume that all players are in a common room, where they can freely discuss their
strategies. Then the agents, one by one, leave the room. Once an agent leaves the room,
she cannot change her strategy. The agents that are left in the room are allowed to discuss
and (cooperatively) change their strategies.
Unfortunately, these equilibria are not guaranteed to exist. This is what we expect since
a Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium must be essentially a Nash Equilibrium. For the sake
of completeness of the presentation, below we show an appropriate example in which there
is no Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium.
Example 3. Consider the example from Proposition 8. There is a project with the budget
v = 5; and three identical agents a, b, c with minimal salaries φmini > 2. Every team formed
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by any two agents is feasible. There is no Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium in this example
(independently whether the salaries of the agents are natural or rational numbers). Indeed,
consider any vector of payoffs 〈φa, φb, φc〉. If φa > 2, we infer that a forms a winning
team with one of the agents b, or c. Without loss of generality we assume that {a, b} is
the winning team. Thus, φb < 3 and φc = 0. If we consider the subgame formed by the
agents b and c, we see, however, that their payoff vector 〈φb, φc〉 is Pareto-dominated by
〈3, 2〉. Now, let us consider the case when φa < 2. One of the agents b and c needs to have
payoff lower than 3 (w.l.o.g let us assume that this is the agent b). But, if we consider the
subgame formed by the agents a and b, their payoff vector 〈φa, φb〉 is Pareto-dominated by
〈2, 3〉. Finally, let us assume that φa = 2. We infer that one of the agents b and c gets
zero payoff (let us assume that this is the agent b). However, the payoff vector 〈φa, φb〉 is
Pareto-dominated by 〈3, 2〉.
B.5 Graph Interpretations
Let us consider a directed multi-graph in which the vertices are the strategy profiles. Each
pair of vertices can be connected with at most two edges, corresponding to implicit and
explicit endangerment. Thus, vertices v and u are connected by an edge corresponding to
the implicit endangerment if and only if v is implicitly endangered by u. Analogously, v
and u are connected by an edge corresponding to the explicit endangerment if and only if
v is explicitly endangered by u.
Clearly, in such a graph, strong Nash equilibria correspond to the sinks, the vertices
with no outgoing edges. Also, the edges corresponding to explicit endangerment do not
form cycles. Consequently, we can restrict our graphs to these induced by the vertices that
do not have outgoing edges corresponding to the explicit endangerment. We believe that
every connected component in such restricted graphs defines an interesting set of stable
solutions. We plan to analyze this idea in our future work. For instance, thus defined set of
stable solutions is always non-empty and its elements correspond to weakly winning teams.
C Finding Feasible Teams in a Scheduling Model
In Sections 4 and 5 we show that many problems of finding the (weakly/strongly) winning
teams or determining whether a given team is (weakly/strongly) winning require solving
the subproblem of finding the feasible team. The general model (Section 2) assumed that
given a team there is an oracle deciding whether there exists a feasible team.
By specifying an oracle, our results can be applied to two different problems known in
the literature: the commodity auctions and the path auctions.
In the commodity auctions setting, the project can be seen as a set of items I =
{i1, i2, . . . , iq} , where each agent owns a certain subset of the items. A team is feasible if
the agents have together all the items from I.
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In the path auctions setting [9] we are given a graph G with two distinguished vertices:
a source s and a target t. The agents correspond to the vertices in the graph. A team is
feasible if the participating agents form a path from s to t.
In this section we show a possible concrete instance of this model in which a project is
a set of indivisible, independent, tasks and agents are processors who process these tasks
with varying speeds.
C.1 The Scheduling Model
A project consists of a set T = {t1, t2, . . . , tq} of q independent tasks. The tasks can be
processed sequentially or in parallel. The tasks are indivisible: a task must be processed on
a single processor. Once started, a task cannot be interrupted. All tasks must be completed
before a given time d, the project’s deadline.
Agents correspond to processors (in this section we use terms “agent” and “processor”
interchangeably). Each agent has certain skills which are represented as the speed of ex-
ecuting the tasks. Thus, for each agent i we define the skill vector si = 〈si,1, si,2, . . . si,q〉
which has the following meaning: agent i is able to finish task tj within si,j time units (with
si,j =∞ when the agent is unable to finish the task). We assume that si is known for each
agent (it can be well approximated, e.g., from past behavior of the agents certified by clients
in form of reviews). An agent can process only a single task at each time moment—if she
wants to process more than one task, she must execute the tasks sequentially. We assume
that only a single agent can work on a given task. This assumption is not as restrictive as
it may appear; if the task ti is large and can be processed by multiple agents in parallel,
the project client will rather replace ti by a number of smaller tasks.
For a team C we define ΦC : T → NC to be an assignment function (assigning tasks to
agents). The assignment function ΦC enables us to formalize the notion of a team completing
the project before the deadline and also the total cost of the team. Specifically, a project is
finished before the deadline d if and only if all the agents finish their assigned tasks before
d, ∀i ∈ NC :
∑
ℓ:Φ(tℓ)=i
si,ℓ ≤ d. In the hourly salary model, the cost of the team is equal to
cC =
∑
i∈NC
φC(i)
∑
ℓ:Φ(tℓ)=i
si,ℓ.
In the scheduling model we define the problem of finding a feasible team as follows.
Problem 2 (FFTSM: Find Feasible Teams, Scheduling Model). Let T be the set of q tasks
and N be the set of processors (or equivalently, agents). For each task tj ∈ T and each
processor (agent) i ∈ N we define si,j as the processing time of tj on i. Let φ
min
i be the
cost of renting processor i (hiring agent i). The budget of the project is v and the deadline
is d. The FFTSM problem consists of selecting a subset of the processors N ′ ⊆ N and the
assignment function Φ : T → N ′ such that the budget is not exceeded (cN ′,Φ ≤ B) and the
project’s makespan does not exceed the deadline d.
In the hourly salary model, the problem of finding the feasible team reduces to the
problem of scheduling on unrelated processors with costs. Specifically, there exists a 2-
approximation algorithm for approximating the makespan (the deadline d in our model).
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Problem 3 (FFTHS: Find Feasible Teams, Hourly Salary). The instances of the problem
are the same as in the FFTSM problem, except that in the FFTHS problem we additionally
specify that the cost of the team cN ′,Φ is defined as cC =
∑
i∈NC
φC(i)
∑
ℓ:Φ(tℓ)=i
si,ℓ.
The project salary model is a generalization of the problem of minimizing makespan
on unrelated processors. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been stated
before; thus we formally define it below.
Problem 4 (FFTPS: Find Feasible Teams, Project Salary). The instances of the problem
are the same as in the FFTSM problem, except that in the FFTPS problem we additionally
specify that the cost of the team cN ′,Φ is defined as cN ′,Φ =
∑
i∈N ′ φ
min
i .
An easier variant of the problem, in which the goal is to optimize the assignment only
(assuming that the processors are already selected) has a 2-approximation algorithm. How-
ever, adding the notion of the budget usually significantly increases the complexity. We
believe that the approximability of FFTPS is a very appealing problem.
C.2 FFTPS: Hardness Results
First, we show the NP-hardness of FFT-Scheduling in restricted special cases.
Theorem 16. FFTPS and FFTHS are NP-hard even for two agents.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from the partition problem. In the partition problem, we
are given a set of integers {nj}; we ask whether there exists a partition of this set into two
subsets S1, S2, such that
∑
nj∈S1
nj =
∑
nj∈S2
nj. To construct an instance of the feasible
team problem, we construct a project that has a task for each nj, an unlimited budget and a
deadline d = 1/2
∑
nj. We take two agents a and b with processing speeds sa,j = sb,j = nj
and unit costs: φmina = φ
min
b = 1. A feasible team corresponds with partitioning numbers
into two with equal sums.
Theorem 17. FFTPS is NP-hard even if the agents can be assigned no more than 3 tasks,
if each agent has no more than 3 skills (for each j we have that ‖{i : si,j 6= ∞}‖ ≤ 3), if
the deadline is constant, and if the minimal salaries of the agents are equal 1.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from the exact set cover problem. In the exact set cover
problem we are given a set of elements T = {t1, t2, . . . , tq} and family S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn}
of 3-element subsets of T . We ask whether there exist q3 subsets from S that cover all the
elements from T . The exact set cover problem is NP-hard even if each member of T appears
in at most 3 sets from S.
We build an instance of the feasible team problem in the following way. There are q
tasks and n agents; for each agent i and each task tj we have that si,j = 1 if and only if
tj ∈ Si. Otherwise, si,j = ∞. The deadline d is equal to 3. The minimal salary of each
agent is 1 and the budget v to q3 . It is easy to check that there exists a feasible team if and
only if there exists a cover of T with q3 sets.
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Theorem 18. FFTHS is NP-hard even if the agents can be assigned no more than 4 tasks,
if each agent has no more than 4 skills (for each j we have that ‖{i : si,j 6= ∞}‖ ≤ 4), if
the deadline is constant, and if the minimal salaries of the agents are equal 1.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from the exact set cover problem. We are given a set of
elements T = {t1, t2, . . . , tq} and family S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} of 3-element subsets of T . We
assume that each member of T appears in at most 3 sets from S.
We build an instance I of the feasible team problem in the following way. There are
q + n tasks and 2n agents. The first q tasks t1, t2, . . . , tq correspond to the elements in
T . The next n tasks tq+1, tq+2, . . . tq+n are the dummy tasks needed by our construction.
The first n agents 1, 2, . . . , n correspond to the subsets from S and the next n agents
(n+ 1), (n+ 2), . . . , 2n are the dummy agents. The minimal salaries of all agents are equal
to 1.
For each agent i, i ≤ n and each task tj, j ≤ q, we set si,j = 2 if and only if tj ∈ Si;
otherwise si,j = ∞. Also, for each agent i, i ≤ n and each task tj, j > q we set si,j = 5 if
and only if i = j − q; otherwise si,j = ∞. For each agent i, i > n and each task tj we set
si,j = 6 if and only if i − n = j − q; otherwise si,j = ∞. The deadline d is equal to 6 and
the budget v is equal to v = 73q +5n. Clearly, each agent has no more than 4 skills and so,
in any feasible solution, cannot be assigned more than 4 tasks.
We will show that the answer to the original instance of the exact set cover problem is
“yes” if and only if there exists a feasible team in the our constructed instance I.
⇐= Let us assume there exists a feasible team C. The cost of this team is at most equal
to v = 73q+5n. Each non-dummy task (there are q such tasks) takes 2 time units, and thus
implies the cost equal to 2. The dummy tasks can be assigned either to non-dummy agents
(implying the cost 5) or to dummy agents (implying the cost 6). Thus, we infer that at
most q3 dummy agents are assigned a task (2q +
1
3q · 6 + (n−
1
3q) · 5 = v). As the result at
least (n − q3) dummy tasks must be assigned to non-dummy agents. A non-dummy agent,
who is assigned a dummy task cannot be assigned any other task (otherwise the completion
time would exceed the deadline). Thus, at most q3 non-dummy agents can be assigned non-
dummy tasks. The non-dummy tasks can be assigned only to non-dummy agents. We see
the subsets corresponding to these non-dummy agents who are assigned non-dummy tasks
form the solution to the initial exact set cover problem.
=⇒ Let us assume that there exists the exact set cover in the initial problem. The agents
corresponding to the subsets from the cover can be assigned tasks so that the deadline is not
exceeded and the total cost of completing these tasks is equal to 2q. The other (n− q3) non-
dummy agents can be assigned one dummy task each. Finally, not-yet assigned dummy
tasks can be assigned to dummy agents. The total cost of such assignment is equal to
2q + (n − 13q) · 5 +
1
3q · 6 = v.
This completes the proof.
Unfortunately, FFTPS is not approximable for makespan, for budget, and even for the
combination of both these parameters.
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Theorem 19. For any α, β ≥ 1 there is no polynomial α-β-approximation algorithm for
FFTPS that approximates makespan with the ratio α and budget with the ratio β, unless
P=NP. This result holds even if the costs of all processors are equal 1.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that there exists α-β-approximation algo-
rithm A. We provide a reduction showing that A can be used as β-approximation algorithm
for SetCover, a contradiction with well-known lower bound of lm(n) on approximating
SetCover. Let I be an instance of SetCover, where T = {t1, t2, . . . , tq} is the set of
elements and S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} is the set of the subsets of T . We ask whether there
exists K subsets from S that together cover all elements from T .
From I we construct an instance of FFTPS in the following way. There are q tasks
corresponding to q elements in I. There are n agents 1, 2, . . . , n corresponding to the subsets
in S. The duration si,j of the task ti when processed by the agent j is defined in the following
way. If ti ∈ Sj then si,j = 1. Otherwise, si,j = αq + 1. The minimal salary of each agent is
equal to 1 and the total budget is K. We show that if there exist K subsets from S covering
T then we can use A to find βK subsets covering T .
Let C denote the covering using K subsets. If we assign each task ti to any agent j
such that Sj ∈ C and ti ∈ Sj , then the completion time of the tasks on each processor
will be at most equal to q. In such case we will use only K processors. Thus A returns
the solution with the makespan at most equal to αq using at most βK processors. This,
however, means that each task ti is assigned to such agent j that ti ∈ Sj. Thus, the subsets
corresponding to the selected processors form the solution of I. Of course, there is at most
βK such processors. This completes the proof.
Theorems 16, 17, and 18 show that the problems FFTPS and FFTHS remain NP-hard
even if various parameters are constant. Although Theorem 16 gives us NP-hardness even
for 2 agents, it is somehow not satisfactory as we used the fact that the deadline d can be
very large. If the deadline is given in unary encoding, we can solve the case for 2 agents
by dynamic programming. Thus, it is interesting if we can solve the problem efficiently for
small numbers of agents, if the input is given in unary encoding. We use parameterized
complexity theory to approach this problem. We ask if FFTPS and FFTHS have FPT
algorithms for the parameter n, the number of the agents, provided the input is given in
unary encoding.
Theorem 20. Consider the number of agents as the parameter. FFTPS and FFTHS are
W[1]-hard, even if all the agents have minimal salaries equal to 1, and if the size of the
input is given in unary encoding.
Proof. We show the reduction from Unary Bin Packing (which is W[1]-hard). In the instance
of the unary bin packing problem we are given a set T of q items T = {t1, t2, . . . , tq} (the
size of the item ti is equal to si) and a set N of n bins, each having a capacity d. We ask
whether it is possible to pack all the items to the bins.
From this instance we can construct the instance of FFTPS (or FFTHS) in the follow-
ing way. Here T will be the set of tasks, N will be the set of agents. The minimal salaries
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of the agents are equal to 1; the speed of processing the task tj by the agent i is equal to
si,j = sj . In FFTPS we set the total budget v to be equal to n. In FFTHS we set v
to
∑
ti∈T
si. Of course, there exists a feasible schedule if and only if there exists a feasible
bin-packing.
C.3 Integer Programming Formulation
In this subsection we state the FFTPS problem as an integer programming problem for the
hourly salary model.
minimize d (8)
subject to
∑
i∈N
aiφ
min
i ≤ v (9)
xi,j ≤ ai , i ∈ N (10)∑
tj∈T
xi,jsi,j ≤ d , i ∈ N ≤ d (11)
xi,j ∈ {0, 1} , i ∈ N ; tj ∈ T (12)
ai ∈ {0, 1} , i ∈ N (13)
In the above formulation, a binary variable ai denotes whether agent i is a part of the
solution (is assigned some tasks, Equation 13). A binary variable xi,j is equal to 1 if and
only if the task tj is assigned to the agent i (Equation 12). We minimize the makespan
d (Equation 8), which is the maximal completion time of the tasks over all the agents
(Inequality 11). We cannot exceed the budget v (Inequality 9), and the tasks can be
assigned only to the selected agents (Inequality 10).
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